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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WAYNE M. PARKER 
and DAVID A. JOHNS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL INC., 
a Utah corporation, 




STATEl\IENT OJ;' KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiffs against the de-
f encl ant for wages earn eel over a period beginning Feb-
ruary 28, 1 !)70, ancl ending November 18, 1970. Plain-
tiffs also claimed attorney fees, court costs and interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The Trial Court, the Honorable Ernest F. Bald-
win presiding, found that the plaintiff \Vayne M. 
Parker was employed by Telegif t Incorporated (here-
i11after sometiuies designated "Telegift") from :March 
3,' 1970, till November 18, 1970, in a "managerial 
capacity" at a salary of $200.00 per week. The Court 
also found that the plaintiff David A. Johns was 
crnploycd hy Tclcgift from February ::!8, 1 ~)70, until 
X o\·e111her 18, 1 !l70, at the same weekly salary. The 
Court eo11cludcc1 that Tele gift Incorporated, which was 
not a party defendant. owed the plaintiffs $G,500.00 
plus an attomey fee of *l,;300.00 (R. 112). 
The Court then fournl that Telegift Incorporated 
h:ul been aequired h~· X atio11al (;ift Enterprises (here-
inafter sornetimcs designated "National" or "National 
( ~ift'') whieh, in tum, had heen acquired by Telegift 
I 11 lerna tional. I IH'. (hereinafter sometimes designated 
"K iahah" or ''Tclegi ft l ntenwtional"). The trans-
adi1 JI JS "·c1·e dcsigna tee 1 as stoek for stPck rather than 
stoek for asset aequisitions, the Court expressly finding 
that "X o assets of Tclcgift Incorporated were acquired 
by X ational" arnl that "X o assets of National were 
aequirell" b~· 'felcgift International (R. 112). These 
findings led the court to condmle that Telegift Inter· 
national "di<l not assume" and was not obligated for 
the indebtedness of Telegift .• Judgment was entered 
against the plaintiffs ancl for the clef endants, no cause 
of action. 
From this .Judgment the plaintiffs appeal. 
HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Trial Court made findings concerning the pre· 
<'isc amount of the plaintiffs' wage claims and attor· 
ney's fees. Plaintiffs seek the reversal of the Judgment 
entered on .June 1, 1972, and request that this Court 
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find, as a matter of law, that the respondent is obli-
gated for the indebtedness of Telegift Incorporated to 
the plaintiffs in those amounts previously specified in 
the Trial Court's findings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'Vayne l\1. Parker ancl David A . .Johns were hired 
h)· Telegift I ncorporatecl on l\larch :J and February 28, 
l !l70, respectively. Tele gift, as the name suggests, was 
in the gift hy phone or wire business much like FTD 
florists. The plaintiffs were hired in managerial capa-
cities as national sales managers ( R. 184). l\Ir. Pm·k·~'· 
j 
was appointed Eastern Sales l\lanager and l\Ir .• Johns 
was appointed 'Vestern Sales l\Ianager of the corpora-
tion ( H. 185). Both were hired for a base salary of 
*:W0.00 per week plus expenses, plus an override for 
business clone within their territory ( R. 157, 183, 184). 
Both were introduced to clistrihutors of the company 
as management functionaries ( R. 184). Both were 
designatecl as management employees in correspondence 
sent from Company headquarters ( R. 185). Each had 
responsibilities consistent with management functions 
including, hut not limited to, opening new sales areas, 
hiring sales managers, training employees, directing 
distributors, resolving disputes and handling a multitude 
of other managerial problems (R. 184, 186). Both of 
the plaintiffs made sales in the course of supervising 
the hiring and training of Telegift's sales force. Neither 
ever received an m·e1Tide or commission on any such 
3 
sale (H. 187) . .Xt.:ithcr Johns nor Parker eYer signed 
an independent eo11tractors agreement although sales 
personnel were always required to do so ( H. ~45, 24G). 
Sometime shortly after the plaintiffs were first 
t·n1ployec1, Telcgift became rnwhle to pay their salaries 
when due. On se\·eral Ol'casions, plaintiffs receiver! 
chcf'ks drawn nn ins11 f ficient f urnls ( ll. 18H) . In con. 
siderntion of 11wir agreeing to remain on the job, \rith. 
out regular pa~', plaintiff's were promis~cl that their 
;.rnges woul<l he paid in full awl that they woulcl re1·eire 
1-·tock options (IL 18!l, 1 no) . Payment was assured, 
plaintiffs were aclYise<l, as soon as Tclegift merged 
with one of se\·eral possible merger partners1 whirh 
would, in theory, proYide adequate working capital for 
the corpora ti on ( R. 18!>-mo) . On the basis of such 
representations, l\J r. Parker worked sixteen and one-half 
weeks, intermittently, withont pay and .i\Ir. Johns 
worked sixteen weeks ( H.. 17 4, 177. 189, mo). 
On approximately ~ oyernher 18, 1970, the plain· 
tiffs were jointly terminated. On February 8, H>71, a 
Complaint was file<l against Telcgif't International, Inc. 
by the plainti l'fs in the Thinl District Court for Salt 
Lake ConHty (R. 1). The 'lefendant asserted in its 
answer that it was not a proper party defendant to the 
lawsuit arnl that plaintiffs' claim, if any, was against 
IQne of such partners was, reportedly, Argus Camera. (See 
testimony of Clarence L. Jolley, R. 221). 
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Tclegi ft I neorporated ( ll. 4). lt was also Yigorously 
co11k11<lc<l at the time of trial that the plaintiffs were 
not salariell employees of Telegift hut rather sales per-
smmcl hired on a commission basis (R. 227). It was 
asserted that the money actually paid to the plaintiffs 
was an advance on commissions ( R. 22!)), and that when 
the plaintiffs were terminated they were obligated to 
Telegi ft for amounts overdrawn ( R. 238, 239). 
The Trial Court, in the face of the defendant's 
representations which were "cliametrically opposed" (It. 
258) to those of the plaintiffs, found that the plaintiffs 
were not commissioned employees or independent con-
tractors ( R. 258, 259). 
The def cndant supported its argument that Tele-
gift International was not obligated for Telegift's in-
debtedness by producing two separate Plans of Re-
organization as Exhibits D-3 and D-4. The Exhibits 
were introduced as proof that on August 24, 1970, Na-
tional Gift Enterprises acquirecl all of the issued and 
outstanding shares of Telegift Incorporated, and that 
on October 16, 1970, Kiahab International Inc. (for-
merly Kiabah Uranium Corporation and later Telegift 
International, Inc.) acquired all of the outstanding and 
issued shares of National Gift Enterprises. These trans-
actions were each characterized by the defendant as 
1'tock for stock transactions resulting in the acquisition 
of Telegift by Telegift International. The latter was, 
allegedly, a holding company, the former its wholly 
5 
o\\'ncd s11hsidiarY (See defendant's ~le111orandum, R 
8:l). 
Se\'eral months after Telcgift \nts acquired hy 
Telegift lutcrnational. sc,·eral "inYestors" acquiretl 
contrnl of Telegift International. The new "inYestors", 
s11pposecllr operating as :111 unincorporated entity called 
\\T eenig Enterprises ( H. -J.()). settled numerous claims 
of creditors for a small peree11tage of their face value . 
.. \lH~l nIRNT 
POINT I 
THE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN TELEGIFT, 
INCORPORATED, NATIONAL GIFT ENTER-
PRISES AND TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, 
INC. WERE ILLUSORY. THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THAT STOCK FOR 
STOCK ACQUISITIONS BETWEEN CORPORA-
TIONS DEALING AT ARMS-LENGTH ACTUAL-
LY OCCURRED. 
The issue hcfore the Court on this appeal is 
whether O!' llot Telegift International is chargeable with 
Tdcgi ft's obligations. The problem in resoking that 
questillll is co111plicatcd hy a series of transactions i1wolr-
i11g alleged!~, Sl'parate corporations. The legal theory 
of the defendant is that in a stock for stock acquisition 
the aeq11iring corporation is not liable for the acquired 
corporation's indebtedness. Consequently, the defendant 
asserts that X ational Gift Enterprises was not obligated 
for the debts of Telegift Incorpoi:ated and that Tele-
6 
gift I 11 tern a tio11al I ne. was not ohliga tecl for the debts 
of either :\'" ational Gift Enterprises or Telegift In-
corporated. Defendants argue that National Gift was 
a subsidiary of Telegift International arnl that Telegift 
was the subsidiary of National Gift. 
'felegi ft Incorporated he fore its irwolvement with 
the defendant or National Gift had good and bad fea-
tmes. The good features included the assets of the 
corporation which were the product of much travel ex-
pense arnl leg work and which were simply not replace-
able without substantial and costly duplication and ef-
fort. Those assets were "nine distributors covering 
fifteen states, 8!) dealers, and approximately GOO dealer 
applications awl inquiries for dealerships" (Exhibit 
P-:!). They included the "Telegift system and trade-
mark" which was, after the work that had heen done, 
an asset of significant value to the success of the busi-
ness ( R. 45, paragraph 2). The corporation, however, 
also had, accorcling to its counsel, debts in the amount 
of $1:33,817.00 at the time it was "acquired" by National 
Gift (IL 7H). 
The critieal problem concerned how to claim the 
corporation's benefits and yet substantially avoid its 
burdens. Stripped to the hare hones, the procedure used 
was as follows. On August 24, 1970, National Gift 
aecpiired all of the stock of Telegift Incorporated (R. 
76). lVhen this transaction occurred Clarence L. Jolley 
was the President of Telegift Incorporated, Max L. 
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Bmdick was Yicc Presidc11t and I )ennis Crimshaw was 
Secrelary-Treasmer ( H. :Wt). Thomas H. Blo11q11ist 
was its attornc\' a11d resident au:enl. On Oetoher ]{) . '' , 
I !li'O, a s<'ant three weeks latc1·, N '.ttional Ci ft and its 
new suhsidiar~· was acquired hy Telegift lnternation:il 
(then 1\.ialwb) a11 old urnnium corporation, whieh bad 
been dormant for fourteen years but whose shares could 
he p11hliel~· sold without further qualification with state 
or t'edcral regulatory bodies. After this transaction 
Tckgi ft I llternational was. until a surrender of eontrol 
to the "i 11vestors" on December 20. I U7 0, several months 
later. managed b~· its President, Clarenee L. .Jolley, its 
\~ice PrPsidenl. :\I ax Burdi('k, ancl its Secretary-Treas-
mer. I>c1111is (~rimslww (IL :W4). Its legal affairs were 
handled hy its attorne~· a11d re~ident agent Thomas R. 
l~lonq11ist nncl the corporation operated under the s11h-
sta11tiall~· same name ancl from the same address as the 
suhsidiar~· of its subsidiary, Telegift Incorporated. Dur· 
i11g this period, each of the officers and directors 
ostensibly operaled in a dual capacity for both Telegift 
International. Im·. and Tele gift ln<'orporated.2 
From the time of the so-called acquisition, Telegift 
International trealell, as will he later seen, both the 
2fn a companion case presently pending before the Third 
D1~trict Court, !,arry Wilkins vs. Trl1 gift International, Inc .. 
Civil No. 197927, the defendant .:1dmittcd that Messrs. Jolie)'. 
Burdick, and Grimshaw abo became directors of National Gift 
Enterprises during October of 1970, and that these three were 
the only directors present at the last meeting of National Gift's 
Board nn Dec:embcr 21, 1970. Mr. Blonquist was apparently also 
the attorney for National Gift Enterprises (R. 217). 
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assets and creditors of Telegift as its mrn, controlling 
the corpora tio11 's activities such as they were. 3 \\rith re-
sped to creditors, however, the COJffcnient fiction of 
!llllltiple corporations was rnaintainecl. \Vith cash al-
kgccll~' received from an investment group comprised 
of the "investors", all of whom sat on Tclegift Inter-
nalional's Board of Directors, and with capital stock 
of 'l'elegi ft I ntemational, the corporation induced 85 
c·rcclitors to settle claims totalling $15,748.07 for 
8.>,:WG.!l5 in cash and 18 creditors to settle claims of un-
known value for 2;'59,73;3 shares of Tele gift Interna-
tional, I ne., the olcl uranium corporation's, capital 
stock ( U. () 1-65) . 
POINT II 
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL INC. WAS l\"JT 
A HOLDING COMPANY. THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT TELE-
GIFT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVELY ENGAGED 
IN THE GIFT TRANSFER BUSINESS. 
Defendant's counsel asserted numerous times in 
argument that the clef endant was a holding company 
a11cl that its only asset was the issued and outstanding 
shares of National Gift Enterprises which in turn owned 
Telegift (R. 7G, paragraph 6). A holding company is, 
of course, a corporation created for the express purpose 
3The laf't meeting of Telegift's Board of Directors was in 
December of 1970 (R. 48, 206, 207). The corporation was 
suspended on September 15, 1971, for failing to pay franchise 
taxes (R. 107). 
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of al'quiring and holding stock of other corporations. 8 
Flcfl'licr, "Corporations" § 704(). 
The testi111011y of Clarence L . .Tolley, who sat at 
counsel tahie with defense counsel during the trial, and 
who sen·ed simultaneously as President of Telegift and 
President of Telegift 111tcmational, Inc., did not sup-
port this analysis. II is testimony, as pertinent, was as 
follows: 
.:UR. 1\ LLH ED: "Xow. when you were sen·-
ing as President of both of those corpora-
tions, which were supposed to be separate 
... what were the functions of Telegift, 
l ne., aJl(l what were the functions of Tele-
gift l 11tcrnatio11al, Inc.?" 








"I 11 other words, they were both in the same 
h11siness; is that corr~ct ?" 
"~leani11g the gift transfer business?" 
''\Tes''. 
"A11d there was 110 distinction, to your 
knowledge, as to any diverse functions, as 
between those two corporations?" 
"Xo". (R. 218, 219). 
Althcnwh ~lr .• Tolley's admisison should dispose 
I:"> • 
of the matter, there are se\•eral additional things which 
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s11ggt·st that the functions of Telcgi ft International 
we11t far beyond those of a mere holding company. 
The 11:u11e, 'l'clcgift International, Inc., itself, 
arg·ues against the theory that the corpnratio11 is a hold-
ing compan~'· All of the good will of a gift by phone or 
wire h11si11css such as Telegif't Incorporated, and all of 
its prior cf forts and expense to geographically expand 
and puhlici:.r,e its services, is tied up in the name. The 
original name of Telcgift Intemational was Kiabah 
Uranium Corporation (R. 22, paragraph 12). 'This was 
s11hscq11entl~r changed Oil October 20, rn10, to Kiali~h 
Jntcrna tional, Inc. Presumably, if Kiahab had been ;'t 
holding company, the name change was intended to 
i111pl~' that it was a holding company of international 
dimensions. A much more plausible explanation, how-
e,·er, of this initial change is furnished by some consid-
eration of the nature of the "gift by phone or wire 
lmsiness". On N O\'emher 12, rn70, the name was 
changed to Tck-gift International, Inc. (R. 22, para-
graph 12). The final change was effected because the 
name K iaha b International Inc. "did not describe the 
acliritirs of the Corporation" (R. 48, paragraph 22). 
The name Telegift did. l•-,or, as the Proxy Statement 
sent to shareholders in connection with the transaction 
he tween" Kiahab" and Tele gift indicated, "If the Share-
holders ratify the acquisition of all of the outstanding 
stoek of National, Kia bah 'Will be actively engaged in 
the gift lm~incs.<; and the name KIABAB INTERN A· 
'l' I 0 NA L, INC. would not describe the activities of 
II 
the Corporation" ( Ernphasis supplied) (Rxhibit P-2). 
So, we arc told, the alleged "holding" company took the 
name of a subsidiary of a subsidiary to describe lllore 
appropriately its function. 
The facts elicited duriug the course of the trial 
clearly indicate that the defendant was not a holding 
company hut that it was "aetiYely engaged" in the gift 
transfer business using all of the resources but failin()' 
1' 
to a!"s11111e the responsibilities of the subsidiary whose 
name it bore. Telcgi ft International was merely a con-
tinuation of Telegift by Tdegift's own management 
under a slightly a ltercd name. 
POINT III 
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. EXPRESS-
LY OR IMPLIEDLY ASSUMED THE INDEBT-
EDNESS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED. 
Clarence J ,, .Jolley, the dominant figure in both 
corporations, prior to the trial and in other proceedings 
filecl .A ffidaYits ccmcerning the precise question of as· 
sumption. Upon examination, .:\Ir .• Tolley a<lmitted that 
certain AffidaYits in Support of .Motions for Summary 
J udgmc11t in cases preYiously considered by the Third 
District Court, were prepared by his then attorney, Ron-
ald C. Barker, read by Jolley and signed in the presence 
of a X otary Public. Ile indicated that the contents of 
the AffidaYits represented the truth (R. 213). 
Speaking as a past President of both corporations, 
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mid with the unique knowledge of one who supposedly 
sl'tTecl in this dual capacity when the transactions relat-
ing to the accp1isition, or merger, or name change, as the 
case may he, took place, l\lr. Jolley under oath asserted 
that the "assets'' of Tclegift Inc. were "transferred" to 
'J'clcgift International, Inc. and that Telegift Interna-
tional, Inc. "ruommcd and became liable for all of the 
debts arnl obligations" of Telcgift Incorporated.4 
1\lthough the Affidavit was received in evidence 
with some reservations ( H. 213), l\lr. Jolley admitted, 
with some later hedging ( R. 215), that it was true (R. 
213). The Court did receive the Affidavit in evidence 
(H. 21:1, 214). 
The assumption by Telegift International of Tele-
gif t' s debts as expressly set out in the Jolley Affidavit 
is strongly further referenced in correspondence from 
the attomey, Thomas R. Blonquist, to the transfer com-
pany concerning the settlement of Telegift Incorporated 
accounts with Telegif't International, Inc. stock (R. 61). 
The letter reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
.June 30, 1971 
Nelson Transfer Company 
:rnn South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
4Based on these Affidavits, the Third District Court in two 
earlier decisions had held Telegift International, Inc. liable for 
obligations of Telegift Incorporated. See: Mzirray State Bank vs. 
Telegift Inc. et al, Civil No. 197329, Bank of Salt Lake vs. Tele-
gift Inc. et al, Civil No. 197085. 
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He: 1'clcgift lntcn1atio11nl, Inc. 
(; e11tlerne11: 
"Over the past six months an investment group 
has been working with the abm.·c referenced cor-
1wrat ion in an effort to solve its financial prob-
lems . 
.... \s a result of the effort of the investment group, 
nuu:y creditors of Telegift have agTee<l to settle 
their claims against the corporation for invest-
ment stodc I 11 <:ach case the creditor has signer! 
a sdtlement agreement and an investment under-
taking. 
In the hoard of directors meetiug held June 29, 
l !l71, a resolution was passed authorizing the is-
suance of Tc legi ft I ntcrnationn l, I'nc. ea pita! 
stock to those ercditors who have signed the here-
tofore referred to investnwnt undertakings. J\ 
cop~· of the minutes is enclosed herewith for your 
file. 
You are hereby instrude<l to issue shares of Tele· 
gift ] 11ternati;mal, Inc. capital stock to the fol-
lowing persons or companies in the amounts 
indicated . .All certificates are to be stamped with 
the investment stamp arnl the restricted transfer 
t " s amp. 
(Then follows a list of the creditors of Tele gift 
I ncorporate<l. Example: l\lalcolm C. Petrie, the 
aceounbnt who prepared the Financial State-
ments which constitute :E-...::hibit "E." to defend-
ant's .Answer to plaintiff's second set of Inter-
roga tori cs, Il. ()(i) • 
Concluding, Mr. Blonquist says: 
"Thank you for your promptness m handling 
14 
Telcgift matters." (Emphasis supplied). 
The to11e of the letter; its reference to the debts of 
Te kgi ft I neorporated; its characterization of such debts 
as being those of Telegift International, Inc., strongly 
suggests at the least an assumption of liability and at 
the most the disregard of the fiction concerning the 
separate identities of the two corporations. 
Further proof of an assumption is found in the 
Agreement of December 21, 1970, which is in evidence 
as Exhibit P-2. In this document the Telegift Interna-
tional, Inc. "investors" who were, after the execution 
of the Agreement its new officers and directors, char-
aderi:zed themselves as an investment group. Jolley, 
Grimshaw, .Jackson and Burdick, who were, historically, 
the officers of Telegift Inc., assigned their shares, re-
signed their positions and made other adjustments. 
Note that Clarence Jolley, as "Director" (he was 
in fact also President) of Telegift International. Inc., 
signed on the Def enclant's behalf and indicated as fol-
lows: 
6. "It is agreed between Tele gift f "Telegift 
I ntcrnational, Inc." - See Introductory Para-
graph J and the investment group that the lat!er 
shall have Carte Blanche authority to deal with 
the creditors of Telegif't in such manner as they 
see fit, including the issuance of capital sto~k t,o 
them. if necessary, to satisfy the corporations 
debts." 
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~\gain. Tcleµ;ift l11tcrnatio11al, I111.·. µ;iYcs authority 
to settle its <lehts. "'hat those debts consisted of is lll;-
tllistakcahle. As )Jr . .Tolley testified, Tclcµ;ift Intcrna-
tio11:tl. I11e., the shell, prior to al'quiri11g Telegift ln-
corporatc<l had 110 debts other than the $n,ooo.oo for 
actirntion expenses arnl the "historic:1l" indebtedness to 
its ancient shareholders (ll. 210, 211). This was most 
assure<l!y not the subject matter of the Agreement of 
December 21, 1 H70, arnl the stock did in fact subsequent-
ly issue to ('!'editors of Teleµ;ift Incorporated (H. GI). 
Tclcµ;ift I 11tcrnational. Inc. abo agreed to com·ey title 
to the 1\.)()8 Cadillac automobile driYen hy Jolley hut 
O\\'t1ccl h~· Tcleµ;i ft I 11corpora ted (Exhibit P-2). 5 Surely 
the $10,000.00 setUement figure referred to in Exhibit 
P-2 for Clarence .Tolley did not relate to obligations of 
Teleµ;i ft I ntemational to him for the approximate 40-
day period during which he sen·ecl as its President after 
the date 0 r the original transaction he tween the two 
corporations arnl prior to his resignation on December 
20, 1970. It also related to indebte<lness of Tele gift In-
corpora tecl. 
These facts support an assumption and the con-
cept of "de facto" merger. The Third District Court. 
5Note that Telegift International treated the Cadillac auto-
mobile as its own asset in direct contradiction to the statement 
of counsel in the defen:;e memorandum that, "No evidence . , · 
wa,; produced to show that assets oi Telegift were transferre~ to 
Kiabab" and directly contrary to the Trial Court's factual frnd· 
ing-s that "No a::;sets of Telegift Incorporated were acquired by 
National" and "No assets of National were acquired by D~­
fenrlant. .. ". See also the testimony of Clarence Jolley on this 
point (R. 211, 212). 
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Judge Stewart l\I. IIaJ1Son presiding, found such an 
assumption and joint and seYeral liability based on J ol-
lcy's 1\ ffid~wit a!Hl the Plan of Heorganization (Ex-
hibit P-4). The result of the Trial Court's ruling in the 
instant ease was to put the Third District Court in the 
position of m:iking Yarring awl ineo11sistent determina-
tions on identical legal issues in companion cases. Sev-
end other cases presently pending will he determined 
hy the <lceisio11 on this appeal.6 
Comts haYe been liberal in finding the "implied as-
.~umption" of liabilities arnl in determining under simifar 
circumstances that the new corporation was "merely a 
continuance of the old" Altoona v. Richardson Gas and 
Oil Co. v. Commissioner 81 Kan. 717, 106 P. 1025, 
Trrcst Te,rns Refining and Dct•elnznnent Company v. 
Commissioner 08 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. l!lH3). The facts 
arguing for such a conclusion here are compelling and 
persuasiYc. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT, TELEGIFT INTERNA- · 
TIONAL, INC., CONTRARY TO THE FINDING 
OF THE TRIAL COURT, ACQUJRED THE 
ASSETS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED AND 
WAS, ASSUMING A PROPER ACQUISITION, 
SUBJECT TO RULES OF LAW PERTAINING 
TO STOCK FOR ASSET ACQUISITIONS. 
The effect of the transactions between the common 
BLarry Wilkins vs. Telegift International, Inc., Civil No. 
197927, Globe Travel Agency vs. Telegift International, Inc., Civil 
No. 40522. 
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dircl'lors and offi('ers of Tclegift and Tclcgift Inter-
national was to place the assets of the former at the 
llisposal of the latter. The Trial Court errecl in findinrr 
h 
that the transactions between Telegift, National Gift 
Enterprises aJl(l Telegift International were stock for 
stock acquisitions. 
It is apparent from the Affidm·it of Clarence L . 
.Tolle~· in the earlier cases that "the assets of Telegift, 
Inc. "·ere transferrecl to Telegift International, Inc." 
(Exhibit P-2). The Affidavit and the testimony of 
.Tolley constitutes the aclmission of the President of both 
corporations that such a transfer actually took place. It 
is apparent from the terms of the Agreement between 
the investment group ancl Tclegift International that 
the assets of Telcgift were treatecl as the assets of Tele-
gift International (Exhibit P-5). Speaking of Exhibit 
P-5, l\Ir. Jolley's testimony is enlightening with respect 
to seYeral s peci fie assets. 
l\IR. ALLRED: "Xow it [the Agreement, 
P-;'51 also made mention of a 
Caclillac automobile owned hy 
you. Did you own a Cadillac 
~n tomobil~ at that time?" 
l\IR . .TOLLEY: "~o, I didn't." 
Q. "'Yl10 did own the Cadillac, HH>8 Cadillac?" 
A. "Te ]egi ft, I ne." 
Q. "Telegift, Inc., did, but this agreement with 
'felegift International, Inc., made reference 
to that vehicle, ancl said that you would be 















"'J'I t' . I t " la , S ng I • 
"Y 011 signed that, [the Agreement] again, 
on behalf of Telegift Iuternational, Inc. 
giving authority to permit you to retain the 
Cadillac; right?" 
"\~es." 
"And that was equally true of Mr. Charles 
Jackson, who had a 196!) Cadillac of his 
own. \Vho owned the Cadillac driven by Mr. 
Jackson?" 
"~Ir. Jackson." 
"He owned it, in his own name?" 
"Yes." 
"\Vhat was the reason for including that as 
a part of this contract and agreement?" 
" ... it was part of his compensation. Pay-
ments were made on his car as part of his 
compensation." 
"By Telegift, Inc.?" 
"Yes". 
"Awl in this case, again, and I hate to repeat 
the obvious, hut Telcgift International, Inc., 
said the automobile can belong to you, here-
inafter." 
"Yes" (R. 211, 212). 
At this time, when Telegift International the al-
leged holding company, which supposedly held and man-
aged shares and nothing more, was disposing of 
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Tc legi ft' s assets an cl co11tracti11g with Tclcgi ft I nkrna-
tio11a l's Board as indi,,iduals for the settlement of Tclc-
gi f't' s debts. Tclcgi ft Inc. was a corporation without a 
Board of Directors, whieh held no meetings during 1!)71. 
(H. 107. H. 4<8, paragraph Hi). The admitted sale dur-
ing rn71 of $rn,ooo.oo worth of Telegift assets (R. 48, 
paragraph 21, H. 71) must he deeme1l to haYe been con-
ducted, like the disposition of the Cadillac automobiles, 
on authority of Tclegift International Inc. 
If this Court concludes that the transaction be-
tween the corporations was a stock for asset acquisition 
rather than a stock for stock acquisition, then the general 
rule is as follows: 
"Generally where 011c corporation sells or other-
wise transfers all of its assets to another cor-
poration, the latter is not liable for the debts and 
liahilities of the transferor, except: ( l) where 
the purchaser expressl~· or irnplie1ll~· agrees to 
assume such debts. ( 2) where the transaction 
amonnts to a consolidation or rncrµ;er of the cor-
poration; ( :3) where the purchasi~1g- corporation 
is merely a continuation of the selling corpora-
tion; and ( 4) where the transaction is entered 
into fraudulently to escape liability for such 
debts." Fletcher, PriYate Corporations section 
712. 
The numbered items in the ahoYe quotation were 
acceptecl and treated as four separate exceptions, each 
of which would stand on its individual merits, by the 
"N" eYada Supreme Court in the case of Lamb v. LeRoy 
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Corporation 84 XeL~iG, 4;H P.2d 24. The p1ai11tiffs 
contend, based on facts and circumstances recited here 
and elsewhere in the Brief, that each of the four excep-
tions is applicab]e in the case before the Court. 
Courts han• irwo1ved a number of theories to im-
pose liability upon pmchasers of assets who use their 
own stoek to finance the purchase, whether the shares 
are delivered to the selling corporation or to its share-
holders. Several of these theories which have applica-
tion to these facts are hereinafter (liscussed. In the in-
stant case, it is admitted that the Telegift International 
shares were cleli,·ered directly to Telegift Incorporated 
shareholders (R. 47, paragraph 13) . 
.A. Direct Delivery of Consideration for P1tr-
chasc to Shareholders. 
The direct payment of purchaser's stock to selJer's 
shareholders, lea\'ing the selling corporation without 
assets to pay creditors, results in the imposition of liabil-
ity upon the purchaser. 11lcKee v. Standard 11linerab1 
CorJJ. 18 Del Ch 97, 1.36 A.ma. See also: Jennings 
Scf'l and Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. 128 Tenn. 231, 159 
S.\V. 1088. By deliberately bypassing the selling cor-
poration, the purchaser places the seller in a position 
in which it can not pay its creditors. 
"The theory is that if stockholders of one cor-
21 
poration turn <>HT it-; assets to anothl'r eorpora-
tio11, rl'eciYing 1111to thl'mseh'es the stock of the 
transfcrl'e i11 pay111l'11t. the tra11saetio11 is void a~ 
against creditori'i of the former. and thev rnav 
look to the latter for satisfaction to the "cxter{t 
of the ntl11e of the assets receiYe<l." ).llcKcc v. 
Stal!dard Jli11crals Cor11., s111Jra at l 00-101. 
"The courts are in unanimit\' upon the proposi-
tion that when a tra11saction of this sort takes 
place it is a fraud on cre<litors ancl is void as to 
them." 11/ cl\. cc v. Standard 11li11crals Cor11 .. 
s 11 JJra at 10 I. 
Telegift Incorporated after the transaction with 
the Defendant theoretically experienced a net loss dur-
ing rn71 of $a8,17U.OO (ll. 47, paragraph 11). 
13. JJc l 1'acto 11/cr~l:r 
The "de facto" mercrcr doctrine has also been in-t"! 
n1ke<l to prntect creditor's rights in asset acquisitions. 
The doctrine provides that a transaction in the fmm of 
a sale of assets (or a stock acquisition) may, despite 
efforts to give it another form, be treated as a merger. 
See: 8 Cm·itcli, B 11sincss Or~a11i::atio11s at ()4, Ilarito11 
v. Arco Electronics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123, Ilcilbrun v. Sun 
Chemical Corp. as Del Ch 321, BO A.2d 755. 
If treated as a merger, incidents characteristic to 
statutory mergers apply. The most prominent of those 
characteristics is the liability of the smTivor for the in· 
debteclness of the merged corporation. The principle 
of "de facto" merger was accepted and applied by this 
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suggest that the functions of Telegift International 
went far beyond those of a mere holding company. 
The name, Telegift l11ternatio11al. Inc., itself, 
argues agai11st the theory that the corpnration is a hold-
ing compan~'· .All of the good will of a gift by phone or 
wire h11si11css such as Telegift Incorporated, and all of 
its prior efforts arnl expense to geographically expand 
an cl pu hlici:.r,e its sen ices, is tied up in the name. The 
origi11al name of Telegift Intemational was Kiabab 
Uranium Corporation (R. 22, pamgraph 12). This was 
subsequently changed on October 20, 1970, to Kiabab 
International, Inc. Presumably, if Kiabab had been a 
holding company, the name change was intended to 
irnply that it was a holding company of international 
dimensions. A much more plausible explanation, how-
eYer, of this initial change is furnished by some consid-
eration of the natme of the "gift hy phone or wire 
business". On N ovemher 12, 1!)70, the name was 
eha11gcd to Telegift International, Inc. ( R. 22, para-
graph 12). The final change was effected because the 
name Kiabah International Inc. "did not describe the 
act iz·ities of the Corporation" ( R. 48, paragraph 22). 
The name Telegift clicl. For, as the Proxy Statement 
sent to shareholders in connection with the transaction 
between "Kiabah" and Telegift indicated, "If the Share-
holders ratify the acquisition of all of the outstanding 
stoek of National, Kia bah will be activel,ll engaged in 
the gift business and the name KIABAB INTERN A-
T ION AL, INC. would not describe the activities of 
11 
the C'orporatio11" (Emphasis supplied) (Exhibit P-2). 
So, we arc told, the :dleged ''holding" company took the 
11nrne of' a s11bsidiar~· of' a subsidiary to describe lnore 
appropriate!~· its function. 
The fads eli<·itell dming the course of the trial 
ekarl~· indicate that the defencla11t was not a holding 
c·rn11p:111~· hut that it was "aetiYely engaged" in the gift 
transfer business using all of the resources hut failing 
to assume the responsihilitic..:s of the subsidiary whose 
nallle it bore. Telcgift lt1ternatio11al was merely a con-
tinuation of Telegift by Telegift's own management 
u11dn a slightly altered name. 
POINT III 
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. EXPRESS-
LY OR HvJPLIEDLY ASSUMED THE INDEBT-
EDNESS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED. 
Clarcnee L . .J ollc~-, the domirnmt figure m Loth 
corporations. prior lo the trial and in other proceedings 
f i lcl l 1 \ l'f'ida ,.j ts eo11ecrning the precise question of as-
s11m ptio11. l rpon cxa11;inatio11, l\lr . .Tolley admitted that 
certain .Affidavits in Support of l\Iotions for Summary 
.Tudg111rnt in cases pn·yiously eonsidered hy the Third 
District Court, were preparell hy his then attorney, Hon-
ald C. Harker. read h~· .Tolley and signed in the presence 
of a Xotary Public. He inclicatecl that the contents of 
the Affidavits represented the truth (R. 213). 
Speaking as a past President of both corporations, 
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Corporation 81" X ev.27(), 454 P.2d 21". The plaintiffs 
co11te11d, based on fads and circumstances recited here 
and elsewhere in the Brief, that each of the four excep-
tions is applicahle in the case hefore the Court. 
Courts have inn>lved a number of theories to im-
pose liability l1pon purchasers of assets who use their 
own stock to finance the purchase, whether the shares 
arc ddivere<l to the selling corporation or to its share-
holders. Several of these theories which have applica-
tion to tlwse facts are hereinafter discussed. In the in-
stant case, it is admitted that the Telegift Internatio111~ 
shares were delivered directly to Telegift Incorporated 
shareholders (H. 47, paragraph 13). 
A. n,:rcct Deliver!/ of Consideration for Pur-
chase to S harcholdcrs. 
The direct payment of purchaser's stock to sel1er's 
shareholders, lea\'ing the selling corporation without 
assets to pay creditors, results in the imposition of liabil-
it~' upon the purchaser. 11lcKce v. Standard 11/ineral.Y 
CorJJ. 18 Del Ch !l7, 156 A.193. See also: Jennings 
Neff' and Co. v. Cr,ystal Ice Co. 128 Tenn. 231, 159 
S.\V. 1088. By deliberately bypassing the selling cor-
poration, the purchaser places the seller in a position 
in which it can not pay its creditors. 
"The theory is that if stockholders of one cor-
21 
pora lion turn 0Yc1· its assets to a not her corpora-
tio11, rceci,·ing unto thcrnsclYcs the stol'k of the 
trans f ercc in pa~·mcnt. the transaction is Yo id as 
against creditors of the former, alHl thev may 
look to the latter for satisfaction to the 'extci;t 
of the nduc of the assets receiYed." .1.llcKec \', 
·"''tw1dard ,1/i11crols f'orp .. SllJJra at 100-101. 
"The courts are in unanimity upon the proposi-
tion that when a transaction of this sort takes 
place it is a fraud on cre(litors and is void as to 
them." 1llcl\.cc v. Standard 1llinerals Corp., 
SlljJ/'(l at 101. 
Telegift Incorporated after the transaction with 
the Defendant theoretically experienced a net loss dur-
ing 1!l71 of $a8,179.00 (R. 47, paragraph 11). 
It De Facto ill ergcr 
The "de facto" merger doctrine has also been in-
vokecl to protect creditor's rights in asset acquisitions. 
The doctrine provides that a transaction in the fo11n of 
a sale of assets (or a stock acquisition) may, despite 
efforts to give it another form, be treated as a merger. 
See: 8 Cr11·itcli. llusi11css Orgrwizations at G4, l-larito11 
v. Arco ]t,'/cctro11ics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123. Ileilbrun v. Sun 
Clic111ical CorzJ. :38 Del Ch :321, 150 A.2d 755. 
If treated as a merger, incidents characteristic to 
statutory mergers apply. The most prominent of those 
characteristics is the liability of the sunivor for the in-
<lehtellness of the merged corporation. The principle 
of "de facto" merger was accepted and applied by this 
22 
suggest that the functions of Telcgift International 
went far beyond those of a mere holding company. 
The name, Tele gift International, Inc., itself, 
argues against the theory that the corp0ration is a hold-
ing company .. All of the good will of a gift by phone or 
wire business such as Telcgift Incorporated, and all of 
its prior efforts and expense to geographically expand 
and publicize its services, is tied up in the name. The 
orip;inal name of Telegift International was Kiabab 
Uranium Corporation (R. 22, paragraph 12). This was 
subsequently changed on October 20, 1970, to Kiabab 
International, Inc. Presumably, if Kiahab had been a 
holcling company, the name change was intended to 
imply that it was a holding company of international 
dimensions. A much more plausible explanation, hmv-
e\·e1·, of this initial change is furnished by some consid-
eration of the nature of the "gift by phone or wire 
business". On November 12, 1970, the name was 
ehangecl to Telegift International, Inc. (ll. 22, para-
graph 12). The final change was effected because the 
name Kiahab International Inc. "did not describe the 
acti1·ities of the Corporation" ( R. 48, paragraph 22). 
The name 'l'elegift <lid. 11""'or, as the Proxy Statement 
sent to shareholclers in connection with the transaction 
between" Kia bah" and Telegift indicated, "If the Share-
holders ratify the acquisition of all of the outstanding 
stol'k of National, Kia bah will be actively engaged in 
the gift lmsiness and the name KIABAB INTERN A· 
TlONAL, INC. would not describe the activities of 
11 
the Corporation" ( E111phasis supplied) (Exhibit P-~). 
So, we a re told, the a llege<l "holding" com puny took the 
1w111e of a subsidiary of a s1il>sidiary to describe 111ore 
appropriate!~· its f11ndio11. 
The facts elicite1l dmi11g the course of the trial 
clcarl~· indicate that the defcwl:mt was not a holding 
t'•H11pa11~· but that it was ''adi,·el~· engaged" i11 the gift 
transfer business using all of the resources but failing 
to assume the responsibilities of the subsidiary whose 
tiame it ho re. Telegi ft I 11terna lional was merel~r a c011-
ti11uatio11 of Telegift by Telegift's own management 
under a slightly altered name. 
POINT III 
TELECIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. EXPRESS-
LY OR IMPLIEDLY ASSUMED THE INDEBT-
EDNESS OF TELEGIFT INCORPORATED. 
Clarence L . .1 olle~', the dominant figure m both 
corporations, prior to the trial and in other proceedings 
filc<l Affidavits concerning the preeise question of as-
sumption. tT pon examination, l\Ir . .Jolley admittecl that 
certain Affidavits in Support of ":\lotions for Summary 
.T udgment in cases pre\·iously considered hy the Third 
Distrid Court, were prepare<l by his then attorney, Ro11-
ald C. Barker, reacl by Jolley and signed in the presence 
of a ~ otary Public. Ile indicated that the contents of 
the Affidavits represented the truth (R. 213). 
Speaking as a past President of both corporations, 
12 
Corporation 84 Xev.27(), 454 P.2d 24. The plaintiffs 
co11te11<l, hasecl on facts and circumstances recited here 
and elsewhere in the Brief, that each of the four excep-
tions is applicable in the case before the Court. 
Courts have involved a num her of theories to im-
pose liability upo11 purchasers of assets who use their 
0\\'11 stock to finance the purchase, whether the shares 
are delivered to the selling corporation or to its share-
holders. Several of these theories which have applica-
tion to these facts arc hereinafter discussed. In the in-
stant case, it is admitted that the Telegift International 
shares were delivered directly to Telegift Incorporated 
shareholders (R. 47, paragraph 13). 
A. Direct Delivery of Con.Yidcration for Pur-
chase to Shareholders. 
The direct payment of purchaser's stock to seller's 
shareholders, leaving the selling corporation without 
assets to pay creditors, results in the imposition of liabil-
it>' upon the purchaser. 1llcKce v. Standard 1llinerals 
Corp. 18 Del Ch !)7, 156 A.193. See also: Jennings 
Xef'f and Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. 128 Tenn. 231, 159 
S.\V. 1088. Ily deliberately bypassing the selling cor-
poration, the purchaser places the seller in a position 
in which it can not pay its creditors. 
"The theory is that if stock11olders of one cor-
21 
por;1tior1 turn oYer it'> assets lo another eorpora-
tio11, reeci,·i11g unto thcrnseh·cs the slol'k of the 
tra11sl'ercc in payment. the transadio11 is Y<>icl as 
against creditors of lhc former. and thcv rnav 
look to the latter for satisf'adion to the 
0exte~t 
of the Yalue of the assets receiYed." J.llcKcc v. 
,'-,'frll!darrl Jfi11crals CorjJ., SlljJrrt at 100-101. 
"The courts are in unanimity upon the proposi-
tion that when a transadion of this sort takes 
place it is a fraud on creditors and is void as to 
them." J.llc I\. cc Y. S ta11dard 11/i ncrals Corp., 
SllJJl'a at 101. 
Telegi ft Incorporated after the transaction with 
the I )efemlant theoretically experienced a net loss dur-
ing rn71 of $:38,179.00 (H. 47, paragraph 11). 
B. De J!'acto i.ll erg er 
The "de facto" merger doctrine has also been in-
nikccl to proted t•reditor's rights in asset acquisitions. 
The doctrine proYides that a transaction in the form of 
a sale of assets (or a stock aequisition) may, despite 
efforts to give it another form, he treated as a merger. 
See: 8 Cr/'citcli, B11si11css Orga11i:::atio11s at (i4, Ilarito11 
v. Arco ]<.,'lcctrouics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123. II cilbrun v. Sun 
Chemical Corp. :38 Del Ch a:n. 150 A.2d 7.55. 
If' treatecl as a merger, ineidents characteristic to 
statutory mergers apply. The most prominent of those 
characteristics is the liability of the smTivor for the in-
debtedness of the merged corporation. The principle 
of "de facto" merger was accepted an,d applied by this 
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Court in the case of CoojJf'l' v. Utah Light and R,lj. Co. 
:i.> ('tali ;)/0, 102 P. 202. 'J'he "de fado" merger doe-
trine was 111ore recently applied hy the Supreme Court 
of ::\1 cw l\Icxico in A 111crica11 llos11ital and Life Insur-
r111tc Co. •·. Ku 11/"d 71 N .l\l. 1G4, ;17() P.2cl 956. See 
also: 15 Fletcher, "Corporations", section 7127, p. 207, 
and rnmierous cases there cited, Allen D. Choka, "Buy-
ing, Selling and .Merging Businesses," American Law 
Institute-American Bar Association Publication, at 
pages 115 and 11 n. 
PRIOR UTAH DECISIONS 
~ 
Problems similar to those raised on this appeal seem 
to haYe been infrequently eonsidered hy the Court. The 
<le('isions, though ancient, appear, howeYer, to be in line 
with the predominant authority expressed m more re-
cent opinions from other jurisdictions. 
In the Utah case of Cooper v. Utah Light and Ry. 
Co. B.> Utah 570, 102 Pac.202, the plaintiff had a tort 
claim. JI is injury occurred on January 2, 1903, on prop-
erty used by the Utah Light and Power Company. 
Plaintiff recm·ered judgment against Utah Light and 
Power on January 24, 1907. In the meantime, on about 
January 2, rno4, Utah Light awl Power transferred its 
prnperty to Utah I ,ight and Railway Company. The 
sole consideration for the transfer was 3,062,500 shares 
of Utah Light and Hailway stock distributed directly 
to Utah Light and Power's stockholders on a share for 
share exchange. The purchase agreement provided that 
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TTtah 1 ,ight a11cl Po\\'er "should he sold awl tra11sferre<l 
to" l 1 tah Light atHl Hailway. Utah Light and Hailway 
elaimcd ownership of the assets. After the transaction, 
as in the instant case, officers of the purchased corpora-
tion scrvc<l in identical positions with the purchaser. Utah 
1 ,ight awl Hailwa~·, like Telcgift International, hacl 
knowlc<lge of the creditor's claim. The trial court award-
ed the creditor judgment against Utah Light ancl llail-
way which appealed alleging that there was not a con-
solidation hut a sale; awl that Utah Light and Power, 
among other things, cli<l not cmwey its franchise to he a 
eorporation [i.e. it had a separate existence]. 
The Court acknowleclgccl that "a separate and dis-
ti11ct" corporation which has succeeded by a "valid" pm-
ehase and transfer to the property and rights of another 
eorporation was not liable by reason of its succession 
unless it affirmatively appears that the transfer "in 
fact or in l~nr" constitutes a fraud upon creditors or 
unless ''the circumstances attending the creation of tlic 
ll<"ZCJ corporation, awl its succession of the property and 
franchises of the old corporation, are such as to warrant 
a finding that it is in reality a mere co11ti11uation of the 
old corporation." (Emphasis supplied). 
The Court found that. normally speaking, a cor-
poration could sell part or all of its property. But it is 
"clear", said the court, that it cannot sell, or otherwise 
dispose of its property to the prejudice of its creditors 
any more than an indiYidual may sell or gispose of his 
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property to the prejudice or injury of his creditors. The 
Court founcl that the only consideration for the purchase 
of Utah J ,ight arnl Power was capital stock of Utah 
Light and Hailway. It stated, 
"It may he that a creditor cannot complain when 
the shares of stock of the purchasing corpora-
tion are reeeived and held hy the selling corpora-
tion as assets and property of the latter 
eorporation, except on the ground that the con-
sideration was not valu'.thle nor adequate, upon 
the same grournl that he might complain of any 
other consideration ... l~ut we think he may 
very properly complain when the selling cor-
poration and the vender enter into an agreement 
or arrangement whereby all the property of the 
selli11g corporation is to be conve~·ed and trans-
ferred upon a consideration, whether cash, shares 
of stock. or other property, which is not to he 
paid aIHl receiwd as assets and property of the 
selling corporation, but which is to he distributed 
among its stockhoiders, and the property is so 
sold and the proceeds of sale so distributed." 
The distinction between the Cooper case and the 
Tclegift situation, if there is any substantial difference, 
centers arouncl the treatment of the assets. In the Cooper 
case the assets were expressly conveyed to Utah Light 
and Railway. In other words, in the Cooper case, Utah 
Light and Power gave everything it had "except the 
franchise to be a corporation", and its tort claims and 
other indebtedness. In the Telegift situation the stock 
for stock exchange was carried out in an identical man-
ner, although it was a five share for one share exchange, 
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\\'ith the cxccpli<'ll that the assets were not c,l'JJrcssl,1; con-
vc~·cd. They were simpl~· treated as if they were the 
assets of Telcgif't International, Inc. and there was, ac-
cording· to the President of both corporations, an "ar-
ran 0·cn1e11t" rto use the Coo11cr terminolocry] whcreh,· t"""I ..... M.. • 
the "assets" were in fact "transferred" 11otwithstandi11"' 
t"I 
the form the transaction took for other purposes. 
The Court co11cl11<1cd that the transaction between 
Utah Light and Power and Utah Light and Hailway 
was, as to creditor, "not only fraudulent, but 1mlawful." 
The Court said, 
"\V c can coneciYe of 110 arrangement which wo11lil 
more cffeduall~· place all the property of a cor-
poration beyond the reach of the general credi-
tors, and which would be more to their prejudice. 
The selling <'orporation in sueh case is for all 
purposes. outside of the winding up of its af-
fairs, defunet, and in the condition of a dissolved 
corpora ti011. '' 7 
This Court accepted the "de facto" merger doc-
trine acknowledging that there are cases where the 
transfer is "practically a consolidation." 
In deciding for the creditors, the Court concluded 
that among the circumstances to be considered were the 
following, each of \\'hich has equally strong or stronger 
parallels in the present case. 
7Telegift Incorporated was suspended by the Utah Secretary 
of State for non-payment of franchise 'taxes on September 15, 
1971, (R. 107). 
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1. The pmchasing coporation took the property 
awl franchises of the seller "and continued to prosecute 
the f)lt.'ii11css of the selling corporation ... " (Emphasis 
supplied). 
2. "Some" of the principal officers of the selling 
corporation continued to serve in the same capacities 
for the purchasing corporation. 
Aside from the issue of fraud, the court finally 
concluded, that 
" ... the transaction, as found, was, according to 
the authorities heretofore cited, so far as effr 1 ·~ 
ing the rights of creditors, like that of a consoli-
dation or a continuing corporation, rendering the 
purch'.1sing- company liable in equity for the debts 
ancl Jiahilities of the selling corporation." 
The case has been approvingly cited on a number 
of occasions. See particularly, 11 oggan v. Price River 
lrri!fofio11 Co111)HllllJ l84< P. 5:36. 
POINT V 
TELEGIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC. WAS, UN-
DER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, LIABLE FOR 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF TELEGIFT INCOR-
PORATED EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN, AS 
THE DEFENDANT ALLEGED, A PURELY 
STOCK FOR STOCK TRANSACTION BE-
TWEEN TWO SEPARATE CORPORATIONS. 
A. Rules of Law Governing a Stoel£ for Stock 
Acquisition. 
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If one assu111cs, arg11e11c10, as Defendant allege~. 
that the transadion between Tclegift and Tclegift In-
ternatio11al was a stock for stock acquisitio11, and that 
Tclcgil't International was a "holding" compan~·, the 
general rnlc is as follows: 
"...:\ holding compan~· is not liable f'or the 
torts, dchls and obligations of its subsidiary, 1111-
less it uses its stock O\\'tJership in such a rnanner 
as aduall.\· to contrnl and operate the properties 
of its sl!hsidiar~·." L) Fletcher, "Corporations", 
scetion 71:n p. 217. Sec: ,l/arti11 '" Dcn·lo1n111'11f 
Co. of' A 111crica 240 F. 42, Ros.~ '" 1'c.rnR Co. (i8 
A.2<1 a:!I, Costa/I Y. ,lJrwila ]~'lee. Co. 2-1< F.2d 
:rn:~, Bcrkc,11 Y. Third ~ fre1111c ll,11. Co. 244< X. Y. 
H02, 15,3 X. E. !)14. Jlorougli of A mbridgc r. 
Pliilwlcl1il1ia Co. 28:3 Pa.5, 12D ~\.G7. 
The reason for the stock for stock rule is generally 
u11clerstandahle. Under the rule, the purchasing corpor-
ation assumes the risk that the acquired corporation has 
debts whieh were unknown or undisclosed at the time of 
the p11 rchase. \ Vhi le the purchaser does not onlinarily 
hecolllc personally liable for these debts, the existc11ee 
of such clehts may rcduee the Yalue of the purchaser's 
im·estme11t by reclucing the net worth of the eorporation 
whose shares arc acquired. 8 Cm·itch. B usincss Orga11i-
::;afio11s, section HW.01 ( 1), p. 372. The theory runs that 
the purchaser's price will he exeessiYe if the corporation 
whose stoek it has purchased has unknown or undisclosed 
indehtetlness. 8 Ca1_1itch, BusincNs Organizations, section 
1()1.02 (1), p. 57. 
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l mplicit in the foregoing, arnl in the general rule 
reeite(l a hove, are the following presumptions: 
1. The transaction must he an arms-length trans-
action between two separate ancl distinct corporate 
entities. 
2. The purchaser must give value for the shares 
of the corporation which is acquired. See: Cooper v. 
Utah Light and Ry. r'o. 35 Utah .570, 102 P. 101, TfT est 
Tuas Rc/'i11i11g and Dt"L'elopment Co. v. Commissioner 
G8 F.2cl 77 (10th Cir.) 
a. The acquirecl corporation, or subsidiary, must 
he operated in such a manner as to constitute more than 
a mere instmmentality of the purchaser, under the pur-
chaser's domination and control. 
In the instant case, the reasons for the application 
of the general rule disappear. Telegift International, 
the purchasing corporation, had no assets, gave no value 
all(l ran no risk that its investment would he damaged 
b~· this indebtedness of Tclegift. Telegift International 
ha(l liabilities for expenses to reactivate the corporation 
in the amount of $9,000.00 and a "historical deficit" 
of $140,000.00. The corporation had been an inactive 
arnl dormant shell for approximately fourteen years. 
(Sec: Unaudited Financial Statement attached to page 
3 of the Proxy Statement, Exhibit P-2). National Gift 
Enterprises Inc. and Telegift Incorporated, converse-
!~.; had, accepting defendant's figures, (which are 
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quest io11a hlc) for l he 11ine-rno11l h period ending Septem-
ber 30, rniO. allege<l net income of ~lH.),8.31.58. (See: 
Finaneial Statements, Exhibit P-~). 
111 other words, Telegi ft I 11ternalional (then Kia-
hab) the shell, acquired for the exchange of its rnl11e-
less shares what appeare<l to be a going organization 
with substantial assets, an operating history, an organi-
zation an<l profits. Telegif't lncorporatecl's shareholders, 
who eontrolled !)7% of Telcgift International's shares 
a ft er the merger, recei,·e<l really nothing in consideration 
of smTe11<kring their interest in Telegift, not eYen new 
1nanageme11t. 
The alleged acquisition, in its inception, was ef-
fecte<l to permit the public sale of the surYiYing shell's 
stock "·ithout further registration with the Securities 
awl Exchange Commission. It hacl incidental and sec-
011<1ary benefits with respect to the numerous and press- , 
i11g claims of creditors. The two corporations were. for 
all intents arnl purposes. merged although the fiction 
of separate identity was retained for conYenience anJ 
len·ra()'e in dealin(l' with creditors. The claims of the ~ ~ 
appellants were not unknown to Telegift International 
and Telegift Incorporated's dual management. Telegift 
International ga Ye nothing of Yalue for the shares of 
Teleuift Incor1Jorated. /'." 
B. Control Cunsiderations. A 11alysis of E.rceptio11 
to General Huie. 
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"'hilc stock ownership alone does not render the 
~tockholding company responsible for the torts, debts 
and obligations of the subsidiary company, still if the 
holding company uses its stock ownership in such man-
ner as actually to control and operate the properties of 
its subsidiary, it does become responsible. See: Roo,y v. 
1'c.1'aR Co. G8 F.2cl 321; Costan v . .Jlanila Elec. Co. 24 
F.:!cl :J83; Berkey v. 1'hird Avenue Ry. Co. 244 N.Y. 
(iO'.Z, 15.i X.E. Ul4. 
1Vhcrc stock control is resorted to not for the pur-
pose of participating in the affairs of the corporation 
in the normal and usual manner, but for the purpose of 
co11trolli11g the co1111Hmy so that it may be used as a mere 
i11str11111c11tality of' the orcning companlJ courts u:ill look 
through the screen of separate control and place the re-
sp011sibility where it actually belongs. (Emphasis sup-
plied) Radio Craft Co., Inc. v. TVestinglwuse Elec. and 
M a1111f act11ring Co. 7 F.2d 432. 
Consider the extent of the Def enrlant's control and 
operation of its alleged subsidiary, Telegift lncorpor-
a tecl: 
1. After their dealings in October of 1970, and 
prior to December 20, rn70, Telegift and Telegift In-
ternational had the same Presiclent, the same Vice Pres-
ident, the same Secretary-Treasurer, the same Attorney 
and the same Resident Agent (R. 21, paragraph 6, R. 
:!5, paragraphs 37, 38, J alley testimony R. 202-206, 
216, 217). 
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:!. Both of tile eorporalions arc located at the 
same address, a:rn South Third East in Salt Lake Citr . ' 
( Ttah ( H. ~-i, paragraphs :J:!, :rn). 
:J. The only meeting of the Hoard of Directors 
of Tclegift Incorporated after the alleged acquisition 
was attended by all of the Directors of Telegift Inter-
national. the "investors", ineluding l\Iessrs. Boyd, Rur-
diek, \Vee11ig and Haynie, and the attorney, Thomas R. 
Blonquist ( H. -J.8, paragraph IG). 
4. Telcgift Incorporated does not have a func-
tioning Hoard of Directors, nor officers, and has had 
none since December of rn70 ( R. :!2, paragraph H, R. 
47, paragraphs 14 and 15). 
;). Telegift Incorporated has not had a Ifoard 
l\I ceting since Decern her :n. 1970, and has' not had an 
annual meeting since the alleged acquisition (R. 48, 
paragraphs rn and 17). 
H. Telegift Incorporatc<l is a suspended corpora-
tion and has been since September 15, 1971 ( R. 107). 
7. Telcgift International Inc. has taken the name 
of its alleged subsidiary and is, or has been, engaged in 
the husincss of transmitting gifts by phone or wire, the 
same business eonductecl by Telegift Incorporated prior 
to the dealings between the two corporations ( R. 2.5, 
paragraph 39, R. 218, 219). 
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8. Tclcgi ft Incorporated 's debts were compro-
mised by Tclcgift International, Inc.'s "investors" after 
consent, not by Telegift Incorporated's Board, (it had 
none) but rather by Telegift International, Inc. through 
its President, Clarence L. Jolley (Exhibit P-2, R. 207-
212). 
!I. The imlebtedness of Telegift Incorporated was 
compromisc<l with cash furnls contributed by Hany l\I. 
W eC'nig, Dean A. Riddle, Frank E. Boyd, Max J,, 
Bmdiek nnd Louis 1\1. Haynie, all directors of Telegift 
lnternational Inc., and, in part by the issuance of the 
capital stock of Telegift Intemational, Inc. (R. ,f:-i, 
paragraph G). 
10. Assets of Telegift Incorporated in the amount 
of *rn,150.30 were sold during the year 1971, while 
Telegift I,1corporated was without a Board of Direc-
tors (IL 48, paragraph 21, Schedule "F"). 
Such assets were sold without Board approval and 
in viola tio11 of the rights of cre<li tors. 
Summarizing, the law provides that if one corpora-
tion is wholly under the control of another, the fact that 
it is a separate entity does not relieve the latter from 
liability for its acts, and even when one corporation is 
the owner of another, the latter will be regarded as n 
mere trade name, and the real beneficiary cannot resort 
to the fiction of claiming in the name of the latter to 
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defeat bona ficlc creditors. [11 re 1llarcclla Cotton Mills 
8 F.:!d ;'):!~. 
lf by stock ownership, common officers and the 
relation of debtor and ere<litor (all of which arc factors 
in the instant case) 8, or otherwise, a subsidiary corpora-
tion hccomes a mere agency or department of the hold-
ing company, or is used as a blind or instrumentality to 
perpetuate fraud, the holding company earmot escape 
liahilitv for the acts of its subsidiary. Owl ]1'umit!afi11lJ 
• • " l'l 
Corp. v. Calij'ornia <'wwidc Co., Inc., 24 F.2d 718. 
If these rnles clid not apply, and if there were no 
exception to the general rn1c, then all that counsel would 
h:tYe to do in order to aYoi<l the claims of creditors would 
be to characterize a merger, or a stock for asset trans-
action, as a stock for stock acquisition. In the case be-
fore the court, there was no vali<l business purpose for 
acquiring a subsidiary and letting it die from disuse, or 
for a putative parent to he actively involved in the same 
business as its subsi<lary and namesake. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant "acquired" Telegift through a series 
of self-dealing manipulations involving interlocking 
directorates, common officers and conflicts of interest. 
BCounsel for the defendant argued that defendant's stock 
was used to settle Telegift Incorporated's debts. The considera-
tion for such a transaction was alleged to be the settlement of the 
indebtedness of a wholly owned subsidiary. It was alleged that 
the settlements ('reated obligations running from Telegift In· 
corporated to Telegift International. 
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lf it is di fficnlt to more accurately describe what 
actually occ11rrcd, it is because the confusion engendered 
hr two separate acquisitions in 23 clays, changing noth-
ing but the 11iarketahility of the surviving corporation's 
shares, defies more precise analysis. Under the factual 
circumstances, howeYer, it little matters whether the 
dealings hetween the corporations inYolved a merger, a 
stock for asset or a stock for stock acquisition. In each 
case the law is adequately designed to avoid injustice 
through the unfair treatment of creditors. 
The involYement of the "investors" some two 
months after the last "acquisition" had occurred in no 
way altered those rights which had then vested and is of 
little consequence to these deliberations. The facts with 
which this appeal is concerned were pre-cast and in-
herited by Telegift International's present principals 
who, at the very least, have used the "acquisitions" ad-
rnntageously. 
The defendant's argument that Telegift was a mere 
subsidiary of Telegift International, a holding company 
which was not involved in the gift business, was as in-
accurate as its argument that the plaintiffs were un-
salariecl arnl commissioned employees. 
The degree of control exercised by Telegift Inter-
national, the common officers, directors and names of 
the two corporations, the brief time which elapsed be-
tween the "acquisitions" and the disregard of corporate 
formalities, all compellingly argue that the transaction 
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was ilh1sor~· and that the slll'\'1v111g corporation was a 
mere eo11ti1111ation of its predecessor, or, at the Yery 
least, in complete control of its predecessor's affairs. 
This Court is not obliged to accept the defe11dant's 
eharaetcrization that this was a stock for stock acquisi-
tion beeause the defenda11t claimed it was before the 
Internal Hevcnue Service (Exhibits D-3, D-4) .9 The 
s11 bstanee. rather than the form the transaction took, 
govenis. 
The Trial Court made factual findings contrary to 
the express and uncontradicted admissions of the Presi-
dent of both corpnrations and inconsistent with prior 
determinations of the Thinl District Court. (See Argu-
ment, this Brief, Point IV). The Tri'll Conrt Prrecl, 
notwithstanding such findings, in applying the law to 
the faets it found. 
The decision of the Trial Court should he reversed. 
The Court's dollar findings pertaining to the appellants' 
lo!-.s should be assessed against Telegift International, 
Inc. 
Hespectf ully submitted, 
.JOEL ~I. ALLRED 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for A ppcllant.~ 
9 An v more than the Internal Revenue S e r vi c e was 
cbliged to tax a medical partnership as a partnership rather ~han 
as a corporation in a state where corporations were not permitted 
to pr<>.ctice medicine. See the famous Pelton case. Pelton v. Com· 
mis.~ioncl' 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), 
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